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Abstract 
Small heterogeneous groups are increasingly used to negotiate important decisions. This 
study examines how the differences in motivational orientations impact negotiation outcomes 
in three-person groups. We examined the effects on outcomes of varying the number of 
members with an individualistic motivational orientation (goal of maximizing own outcome) 
and with a cooperative motivational orientation (goal of maximizing both own and joint 
outcome). A total of 231 students participated in a negotiation simulation. At the individual 
level, negotiators with an individualistic orientation outperformed negotiators with a 
cooperative orientation in mixed groups. The criteria that determined satisfaction also differed 
depending upon orientation. At the group level, perceived fairness, but not the quality of the 
agreement, varied between groups. Members in groups with only cooperatively oriented 
members perceived the negotiation to be fairer than did members in other groups.  
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Small Group Negotiation: Do Individualists Exploit Cooperators? 
Small groups frequently negotiate important decisions inside and between 
organizations. The groups, e.g., integrated teams and project groups (Keller, 2001), typically 
have members with different professional and organizational affiliations. Negotiations often 
become difficult because members must handle many potentially conflictive concerns. 
Consider, for example, three companies that form a partnership. Members of the negotiating 
group have joint interests related to the success of the partnership, and potentially conflictive 
interests related to the allocation of burdens and rewards between the companies. The mixed-
motive nature of the tasks creates a dilemma for the group members (Lax & Sebenius, 1986) 
regarding how to approach the negotiations. Some members may focus heavily on the 
competitive aspects of the negotiations and be motivated to only maximize their own gain 
(i.e., individualists). They may do so because they believe that the value of getting engaged in 
a partnership depends only on own gain. Other members may be inclined to focus also on the 
joint interests of the emerging partnership and are therefore motivated to maximize both own 
and joint gain (i.e., cooperators). They may do so because they believe a viable partnership 
depends on values being created for all the partners. Thus, given that competitive and 
cooperative forces coexists in many small group negotiations, we may expect members in 
small negotiating teams to be as likely to differ as to share motivational orientations (Brett, 
2001).  
Recent research on mixed-motive tasks (i.e., negotiation) has addressed how group 
members’ orientation affect group outcome (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). The 
research has, however, primarily focused on groups with homogeneity in orientations, that is; 
groups composed of only individualistic oriented members has been compared with groups 
composed of only cooperative oriented members. But cooperatively oriented group members 
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may have to deal with individualistically oriented group members, and vice versa. Research 
on heterogeneity between negotiators in the same group has therefore been called for. In their 
meta-analytic review of orientations in negotiations, De Dreu et al. (2000, p. 902) stated that 
mixed orientations is an “... issue fully ignored in the study of social motives in integrative 
negotiation”. Thus, the purpose of this study is to make a first step to explore how the mixture 
of individualistically and cooperatively oriented members’ affects the outcome in small group 
negotiations. The article starts with a short presentation of the negotiation concept, and of the 
research approach used here and typically in behavioral negotiation research. We then 
describe the concept of motivational orientation, and present the negotiation research that 
helps us to develop our hypotheses. Next, we describe our methodological choices and 
present the result from our experimental study. Finally, we discuss our findings and their 
implications for practice and future research. 
The Negotiation Framework 
Negotiation is a process where two or more parties make joint decisions in order to 
resolve their conflicting preferences (Bazerman, Mannix, & Thompson, 1988). Negotiations 
have several critical characteristics (Thompson, 1990); communication is open and 
interactive, intermediate solutions are feasible, parties can make temporary offers and 
counteroffers, and an agreement is not reached before all parties accept a proposal.  
The basic challenge in integrative negotiations is the mixed-motive nature of the task. 
Negotiation implies tension between the creation and claiming of values (Lax & Sebenius, 
1986). The parties have incentives to cooperate in order to increase the size of the total pie 
(i.e., to integrate). Typically, outcomes better than compromises can be achieved by making 
trade-offs across issues of differential importance to the parties. In order to make such trade-
offs, information exchange and joint problem solving (i.e., integrative behavior) are needed. 
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Simultaneously, however, the negotiators must safeguard themselves against exploitation and 
secure a fair share of the value created for themselves. This is achieved through distributive 
behavior where they argue, focus on positions and ask for concessions. The tension between 
integration and distribution makes negotiations difficult and challenging. Therefore, 
negotiators frequently fail to reach high quality agreements that fully capitalize on the 
differences in priorities between negotiators. Motivational orientations and their interplay are 
here seen as potentially important causes of the process and outcomes achieved in integrative 
negotiations. 
When causal and universal hypotheses are tested in behavioral negotiation research, 
experimental simulations are often used (e.g., Brett, 2001; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; 
Thompson, 1998). Such simulations enable the researchers to create the core negotiation 
dilemma (i.e., the tension between creating and claiming). The use of scoreable outcomes 
enables the researchers to compare outcomes across negotiating groups. Furthermore, the 
controlled setting also makes it possible to test causal hypotheses. It is, however, critical that 
the negotiation simulation capture the essential features of negotiations. Thus, a negotiation 
task should include both integrative and distributive aspects. Furthermore, the simulation 
ought to allow for communication, intermediate solutions, temporary proposals, veto power, 
and give the negotiators information only about their own payoffs. As a result, a negotiation 
simulation differs substantially from matrix games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma game, and 
other experimental games typically used in experimental economics and psychology 
(Thompson, 1990). In our research we do not assume that negotiators are fully rational. 
Neither have they full information about the payoff structure. They have only knowledge 
about their own preferences (and are not allowed to exchange preference charts). The payoff 
matrix is designed such that if they engage extensively in integrative behavior (i.e., link 
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issues, and indicate priorities) they get higher joint outcome than if they engage in distributive 
behavior (i.e., argue over positions on single dimensions). Furthermore, we assume that 
people vary in terms of their motivational orientation. In our study we examine whether 
differences in motives (self versus self and other concerns) affect outcome. Behaviors are the 
micro-mediating process between motivational orientation and outcomes. 
Motivational Orientation 
A negotiator’s orientation is defined in terms of preferences towards own and others’ 
outcomes. The individualistic and the cooperative orientations are especially relevant in 
negotiations, as they parallel the claiming-creation dilemma present in mixed-motive 
situations. An individualistically oriented negotiator has the goal of maximizing own 
outcome, while a cooperatively oriented negotiator has the goal of maximizing both own and 
the other negotiators’ outcomes.  
A specific orientation may have its origin in individual dispositions and/or situational 
characteristics. As an individual disposition (trait), orientation is often labelled social value 
orientation and refers to relatively stable preferences toward certain combinations of own and 
others’ outcomes (Messick & McClintock, 1968). Orientation stemming from situational 
characteristics (state) is usually labelled motivational orientation and refers to outcome 
preferences in specific negotiation episodes (Deutsch, 1994). Situational characteristics 
affecting a negotiator’s preferred outcome distribution may be in the form of explicit 
instructions (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999), responsibility to constituents (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 
1984a), incentive structure of the task (De Dreu, Giebles, & Van de Vliert, 1998), and 
expectations about future interactions (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984b). We focus in this study on 
motivational orientation (state) induced by instructions. From a managerial point of view, 
implications of explicit instructions given to negotiators may be particularly interesting. From 
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a researchers point of view, the use of instructions allows for randomly assignments to 
various experimental conditions. 
Motivational processes are sometimes not explicitly distinguished from behavior and 
performance (Mitchell & Larson, 1987). Motivational orientation is a goal and therefore 
different from behavior (cf. Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999). However, orientation is expected to 
direct behavior and affect performance in negotiations (Deutsch, 1994; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), 
but situational circumstances may alter the choice of behavior. Meeting opponents with 
different orientations, for example, may be one situational characteristic that affects the 
negotiators behavior and thereby the outcome (Olekalns, Smith, & Kibby, 1996). This will be 
further discussed in the next part. 
Hypotheses Development 
We first focus on heterogeneous groups where negotiators with cooperative 
orientations are pitted against negotiators with individualistic orientations. Previous research 
on homogeneous dyads has documented that motivational orientations influence behavior and 
outcome in predictable ways (De Dreu et al., 2000; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Negotiators 
with an individualistic orientation have a tendency to engage themselves in distributive 
behavior (i.e. argumentation, calls for concessions, threats), while negotiators with a 
cooperative orientation have a stronger tendency to use integrative behavior (i.e. multi-issue 
offers, information exchange, supportive statements). Consequently, cooperatively oriented 
dyads are usually found to achieve higher joint gain than individualistically oriented dyads 
(De Dreu et al., 2000).  
However, what happens when cooperatively and individualistically oriented 
negotiators meet? Research on social value orientation in experimental gaming (e.g., Kelly & 
Stahelski, 1970; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988) 
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indicates that members of mixed orientation dyads adjust their choices dependent upon the 
choices of the other (i.e., behavioral assimilation). These studies have generally found that 
cooperators shift their behavior towards non-cooperation if the other consistently chooses not 
to cooperate. Individualists seem less likely to reciprocate their opponent’s behavior 
(Liebrand et al., 1986), but may cooperate only when it is in their self-interest to do so. 
Experimental games are, however, more structured than negotiations (and negotiation 
simulations). Nevertheless, recent research in behavioral negotiation supports the prediction 
that a negotiator with a cooperative orientation may, to some extent, match the distributive 
behavior of an individualistically oriented opponent (Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999). In their 
study, the participants were asked to read conflict scenarios in which their motivational 
orientation and the behavior of the other party were manipulated. Cooperatively oriented 
negotiators were likely to problem solve if their opponent chose to problem solve, but drifted 
towards contentious behavior if the other negotiator contended.  
Given some matching done by cooperative oriented negotiators, the next question is 
how this affects the distribution of outcomes. We believe that negotiators with an   
individualistic orientation will have an advantage because (1) they have planned for 
contending behavior, (2) they will be the first to contend, and (3) they will contend more 
persistently. First, without information about their opponents, negotiators typically expect 
their opponents’ to have the same orientation as themselves (Iedema & Poppe, 1994; 
Kuhlman, Brown, & Tetac, 1992). Thus, an individualistically oriented negotiator is likely to 
expect a distributive negotiation and plan accordingly (i.e. setting high opening offers and 
concede slowly). The cooperatively oriented negotiator, on the other hand, will prepare for an 
integrative negotiation (i.e. making multi-issue proposals and reveal priority information).  
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Second, negotiators with an individualistic orientation will be the first to contend. 
Cooperatively oriented negotiators will not steer towards distributive behavior before they get 
to know the others’ intentions. In a group setting, it is especially difficult to become aware of 
the other parties’ intentions (Kramer, 1991). Thus, we expect an initial mismatch of behavior 
in the early stages of the negotiation. The cooperatively oriented negotiators give information 
and try to develop a joint problem solving process. The individualistically oriented take 
advantage of the situation, present demands, and get an initial advantage in the negotiations. 
An alternative to mismatching is opportunistic behavior by the negotiators with 
individualistic orientations (Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999). They pretend to match integrative 
behavior in order to get an information advantage. Thereby they can get information about the 
other parties’ preferences, strategically misrepresent their own preferences, and get a 
favourable individual outcome (O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997).  
Finally, although cooperatively oriented negotiators may try to match their opponents’ 
behavior, they are not likely to be as persistent in their contending as are negotiators with an 
individualistic orientation. The motivational orientation is assumed to affect the cognitive 
processes of the negotiator (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). As cognitive processes are influenced 
or operate through motivational processes, we believe that individualistically oriented 
negotiators are more persistent in their contending behavior. For example, an individualistic 
orientation is expected to produce a fixed-pie assumption (Pruitt, 1990). Believing that they 
negotiate over a fixed pie makes a distributive approach the only feasible strategy in order to 
maximize individual outcome. If negotiators with a cooperative orientation are less 
susceptible to a fixed-pie assumption, they may occasionally try to change the game by 
suggesting trade-offs and thereby reveal their own preferences. Their opponents then get an 
information advantage. Thus, we put forward the following prediction: 
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Hypothesis 1: In heterogeneous negotiating groups, individualistically oriented negotiators 
achieve higher individual outcome than cooperatively oriented negotiators 
We suggest that motivational orientation not only affect the individual outcome but 
also the criteria the negotiators use when they evaluate the quality of the negotiations.  
Satisfaction is important in negotiation for several reasons. First, in many situations the 
individual may not have strong objective criteria to evaluate the quality of the agreement.  
They may not know which alternative agreements that were potentially available to them. 
Second, satisfaction is important, regardless of objective outcome, because it may influence 
the willingness to implement agreements, and to engage in future negotiation encounters with 
the other parties (Brett & Rognes, 1986). Individualistic and cooperative orientations channel 
the attention of the negotiator in partly different directions. Negotiators with an individualistic 
orientation will most likely focus only on their own results when they evaluate the 
negotiations. People with cooperative orientations are concerned both with own and group 
results and will most likely use a more complex set of criteria when evaluating the 
negotiations. Differences in outcome evaluation depend of course on consistency in 
orientation over time. We believe orientation to be stable and to influence perception of task 
(Pruitt, 1990) and outcome. Therefore, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 2: Individualistically oriented negotiators will base their satisfaction on own 
outcome, while cooperatively oriented negotiators will use both own and joint 
gain as criteria for satisfaction.  
We now turn to questions of the effects of composition (individualistic groups, mix-
orientation groups, cooperative groups) on joint outcome and fairness. As discussed earlier, 
research on dyadic negotiations has shown that dyads consisting of two cooperatively 
oriented negotiators engage in more joint problem solving processes, and are less likely to use 
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pressure-tactics, than dyads with individualistically oriented negotiators. Consequently, 
cooperative dyads generally reach more integrative settlements than individualistically 
oriented dyads, as shown in the meta-analytic review by De Dreu et al. (2000). Two studies of 
group negotiations found cooperatively oriented groups to do better than individualistically 
oriented groups (Beersma & Dreu, 1999; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). However, 
Beersma & De Dreu (1999) compared groups of individualistically oriented negotiators with 
groups with team orientation (i.e., members were instructed to maximize joint gain) rather 
than cooperative orientations (i.e., maximize own and others outcome). Weingart et al. (1993) 
found cooperatively oriented groups to do better than individualistically oriented groups only 
when instructed to consider the negotiation issues sequentially. When instructed to negotiate 
all issues simultaneously, the individualistically oriented groups did as well as the 
cooperatively oriented groups. Neither of the two studies examined mixed groups. 
In mixed motive negotiations, integration (i.e., joint gain) is typically achieved when 
negotiators give in on low priority issues and are firm on high priority issues. The process of 
logrolling becomes very complex in groups as compared to dyads (Thompson, 1998).  The 
parties may, for example, make tradeoffs indirectly (party A gets a concession from B that 
gets a concession from C etc). In order to be able to create values the parties must share 
information, trust each other, and engage in energetic joint problem solving (Kramer, 1991). 
This is most likely to happen when all parties are concerned both with own gain (have high 
aspirations) and with the gains of the others as well. They will help others without being 
altruistic. However, when one or more individualistically oriented member is introduced to 
the group, the cooperatively oriented members are likely, to some degree, to match the 
distributive behavior of the individualistic member(s). This will hinder development of the 
trusting climate necessary for information sharing and complex tradeoffs. The 
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individualistically oriented negotiator may still be able to claim a large share of the pie (see 
arguments above), but the pie will be small as integrative value is not created. Hence, we put 
forward the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Group outcome is higher in groups where all members are cooperatively 
oriented than in groups that have one or more individualistically oriented 
member(s). 
The above arguments also suggest that the shared perception of fairness will be 
highest in groups with only cooperatively oriented members. Members of cooperatively 
oriented groups are found to trust each other more than members of individualistically 
oriented groups, and to be less likely to use substantiating arguments (Weingart et al., 1993). 
The dynamic in groups with cooperatively oriented members may therefore generate 
perceptions of fairness in the exchange, and produce a pleasant group climate. The members 
may also feel that their interests are taken into consideration and thereby value the outcome 
highly. In groups with one or more individualistically oriented member(s), a power game and 
a more antagonistic climate may develop, resulting in less perceived fairness. Thus, in sum 
the above arguments lead to the following prediction: 
Hypothesis 4: Group perceived fairness is higher in groups where all members are 
cooperatively oriented than in groups that have one or more individualistically 
oriented member(s). 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
A total of 231 Norwegian undergraduate business students enrolled in an organization 
behavior course participated in the study. Their mean age was 23 years, and 30% were 
females. The experiment was conducted during a class meeting in the course. The students 
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were informed about the negotiation simulation, and those that did not want to participate 
were free to leave (about 15 students). General background information about the exercise 
was then distributed to the remaining 231 students. The general information contained 
information about the case, the issues to be resolved, and the available alternatives on each 
issue. 
 Next, the participants were randomly assigned motivational orientation, roles, and were 
grouped into three-person groups. We found no significant differences in gender across 
orientations, roles and compositions. With the help from eight research assistants, the groups 
were lead to separate rooms. Each negotiator received an envelope containing (a) confidential 
role instructions and reservation points, (b) manipulation instructions, and (c) a chart. The 
chart consisted of the issues to be resolved, description of alternatives on each issue along with 
some arguments, and the points, or payoff, associated with each alternative. Negotiators saw 
only their own payoff, and were not allowed to exchange preference charts. 
When finishing the preparation, after 15 minutes, the groups started negotiating. They 
were allowed to negotiate for 35 minutes, and got an additional 10 minutes to finalize the 
agreement if necessary. Groups that did not reach an agreement after a total time of 45 
minutes were recorded as impasse groups. Immediately after finishing the negotiations, the 
participants individually answered the post-negotiation questionnaire containing background 
information, manipulation checks, and perceptual measures. Finally, the session was 
concluded with an introductory lecture in negotiation, and the participants were debriefed. 
Design and Task 
There were four different group compositions; (a) groups with three cooperatively 
oriented members (CCC-composition), (b) groups with two cooperatively oriented and one 
individualistically oriented member (CCI-composition), (c) groups with one cooperatively 
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oriented and two individualistically oriented members (CII-composition), and (d) groups with 
three individualistically oriented members (III-composition). On the individual level, the 
design made it possible to compare across the two motivational orientations (cooperative and 
individualistic) in the heterogeneous groups (CCI- and CII-compositions).  
 The experimental task consisted of a three-person negotiation exercise developed for 
this study. The participants negotiated how they would form a business partnership, and 
enacted the roles of managers representing different companies; airline, insurance, consulting, 
respectively. They negotiated the construction of a joint office complex. Five issues, each 
with four or five alternatives, had to be negotiated. The issues were: (1) move-in date, (2) 
geographical location of the building, (3) architectural design, (4) distribution of maintenance 
costs, and (5) establishment of joint service functions. To reach an agreement, the group had 
to resolve all the issues. 
 The payoff matrix is shown in table 1. The matrix is slightly different from those used 
in previous studies of group negotiations. First, the simulation is symmetric. This means that 
all the members have the same maximum achievable points, and equal chances of reaching 
this sum. A symmetrical game makes it possible to compare individual results across roles, 
and it also reduces the incentives for forming stable coalitions. Second, the negotiation 
simulation has two types of issues; integrative and distributive. The three integrative issues 
(issue 2, 3, and 5) allow for joint gain, or integrativeness, through logrolling of the three 
issues. The design of the integrative issues is similar to the structure used by Mannix, 
Thompson, & Bazerman (1989). The two distributive issues (issue 1 and 4) made the 
symmetry in the payoff matrix less obvious, raised the potential conflict level in the groups, 
and made the negotiations more challenging and realistic. The reservation point, or the walk 
away value that the negotiator would achieve if no agreement was reached, was set to 150 
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points, which during pre-tests were found to be high enough to require some effort in order to 
reach an agreement, but low enough to avoid too many impasses. 
Experimental Manipulations 
Following previous research on motivational orientation in negotiating dyads (e.g., 
Pruitt & Lewis, 1975) and negotiating groups (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999; Weingart et al., 
1993), the two motivational orientations, individualistic and cooperative, were manipulated 
through written instructions. The manipulations were presented as instructions to negotiators 
from management (cf. Weingart et al., 1993). In the individualistic condition, the participants 
read the following instruction: 
Today’s decision is very important for the company. The points are indicators of 
profit. The more points you earn, the more profitable the investment will be for the 
company. In today’s decision, you should act out of self-interest. You should be 
concerned with how well you do it yourself. The reason for this is that we in our 
company need a good result in these negotiations. We will carefully examine the 
results when the negotiations are finished. The results will be of great importance for 
your future career-possibilities in the company, and your performance will be 
evaluated by how good a negotiation outcome our company achieves in the 
negotiations. Your primary goal is, therefore, to maximize your own outcome.  
In the cooperative condition, the participants read the following instruction: 
Today’s decision is very important for the companies. The points are indicators of 
profit. The more points the companies earn in total, the more profitable the investment 
will be. In today’s decision, you should not act purely out of self-interest. You should 
be concerned with how well the other parties are doing, as well as how well you do it 
yourself. The reason for this is that we in our company want to have a good 
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relationship with the parties we eventually will be sharing offices with. Also with 
regard to the company’s reputation, we want you to consider the other parties 
interests. However, at the same time, it is decisive that we get a good outcome for 
ourselves. We will carefully examine the results when the negotiations are finished. 
The results will be of great importance for your future career-possibilities in the 
company, and your performance will be evaluated by how good a negotiation outcome 
the three companies achieve in total, as well as the outcome for our company. Your 
primary goal is, therefore, to maximize your own and the others’ outcome. 
Dependent Variables 
Individual outcome. This variable was measured as the total points achieved by the 
negotiator across the five issues, given the final agreement of the group. For example, if the 
group agreed on alternative B on the first issue (see table 1), each negotiator would receive 25 
points on that issue. The negotiators’ scores ranged from 0 points for the least preferred 
alternative on each issue, to an individual outcome of 500 points if the negotiator got the most 
preferred alternative across all the five issues. Individual outcomes within groups had a high 
negative intraclass correlation, ICC = -.43, F (17, 36) = 0.09. This indicates that a high 
individual outcome for one member goes along with low individual outcome for other 
members (Kenny & La Voie, 1985). The observations are thus not independent of each other, 
and the results from analysis of variance are questionable (Hoyle & Crawford, 1994). When 
comparing individual outcomes within groups we therefore used difference analyses. In each 
group, we subtracted the (mean) individual outcome for the member(s) with a cooperative 
orientation from that of the member(s) with an individualistic orientation, and did a one-
sample t-test with a test value of zero (i.e., no difference). This procedure eliminates the 
dependency problem through aggregation, but at the cost of reduced degrees of freedom.  
Small Group Negotiation     17 
Group outcome. We used two indicators of group outcome; (1) joint sum, and (2) 
Pareto efficiency (Weingart et al., 1993). Joint sum is the total points achieved by the group, 
and was measured simply by adding together the individual outcomes of the three negotiators 
in a group. Joint sum is the typical measure of group level outcome in negotiation research 
(Neale & Northcraft, 1991). The maximum joint sum was 825 points, and 675 was the 
minimum score. Pareto efficiency relates the agreements to Pareto optimal settlements. An 
agreement is Pareto optimal if there is no other solution than the one arrived at, where at least 
one member of the group will be better off, without any other being worse. In the task used, 
there are 247 Pareto optimal solutions among the 2000 possible agreement combinations. We 
developed an index based on Tripp & Sondak (1992) where we measured the number of 
possible agreements that were Pareto superior to the solution chosen by each group. The 
groups received a score that reflected the number of possible agreements that would be a 
Pareto improvement compared to the agreement achieved by the group. The variable was 
standardised, and then reversed so that higher values indicate higher Pareto efficiency. The 
correlation between joint sum and Pareto efficiency was .89 (p < 0.001). 
Outcome satisfaction. We measured outcome satisfaction in the post negotiation 
questionnaire by asking the participants to rate satisfaction with the outcome on a five-point 
scale (1 = low, 5 = high). Previous research in psychology and organizational behavior has 
shown that single-item measures of satisfaction produce acceptable validity (Wanous, 
Reichers, & Hudy, 1997). Research finds that single-item measures of satisfaction compare 
favorably to multi-issue measures of satisfaction in terms of validity (Nagy, 2002; Wanous & 
Reichers, 1996). Furthermore, single-item measure of outcome satisfaction is used in previous 
studies on behavioral negotiation (Oliver, Balakrishnan & Barry, 1994). 
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 Perceived fairness. According to social justice theory (e.g., Greenberg, 1987), the 
judgment of fairness are based on two types of evaluations; (1) evaluation of the allocation of 
resources, and (2) evaluation of the process that lead to this allocation. We therefore 
measured perceived fairness in the post negotiation questionnaire by asking the subjects to 
rate outcome fairness and process fairness on five-point scales (1 = low, 5 = high). We used 
the average scores, and treated the index as a formative measure, as the concepts represent 
different parts of the overall fairness judgment. In order to validate the variable at the group 
level, we had to demonstrate a relative homogeneous perception of fairness in each group 
(George, 1990). We used the within-group interrater agreement index (James, Demaree, & 
Wolf, 1984; 1993) to examine the consensus between group members. Agreement within 
group was calculated separately for each group, and for each item. Average interrater 
agreement for the group was .83 for process and .84 for outcome, and did not differ across 
compositions. This is well above the suggested benchmark of .70 (George & Bettenhausen, 
1990), and indicates that dyadic members had relatively similar perceptions of fairness. This 
justifies using perceived fairness as a group variable (George & James, 1993). 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Participants were asked in the post negotiation questionnaire to indicate their primary 
objective in the negotiation. They had to select from three alternatives regarding their 
motivational orientation (Weingart et al., 1993); (1) maximize own outcome, (2) maximize 
own and others’ outcome, and (3) other. Chi-square analysis showed that the manipulation 
had been successful, χ2 (2, n = 229) = 86.40, p < .0001. Those receiving a cooperative 
orientation instruction were significantly more likely than the other subjects to answer 
“maximize own and others’ outcome”, while those receiving an individualistic orientation 
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were significantly more likely to answer “maximize own outcome”. Given the main goal of 
this research, to examine groups with mixed orientations, we included in our primary analyses 
groups where all the members showed perfect correspondence between manipulation 
instruction and manipulation check. In addition, two groups, both in the CII-composition, 
failed to reach agreement and were excluded from the sample, leaving 37 groups in the 
primary analyses. Because of the reduced N in the primary analyses, we also did additional 
analyses where all groups were included (except the impasse groups). Groups were treated 
according to the group members’ answer in the manipulation check. When the hypotheses 
were tested, the results from the additional analyses were similar to the findings from the 
primary analyses. 
Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis 1 stated that individualistically oriented negotiators would get higher 
individual outcomes than their cooperatively oriented opponents. The data supported 
hypothesis 1. Individualistically oriented negotiators got higher individual outcomes (M = 
262.50, SD = 44.53) than did their cooperatively oriented opponents (M = 233.80, SD = 
34.29). A difference analysis showed this difference to be significant, t (17) = 2.68, p < .05. 
Figure 1 displays average individual outcome as a function of own motivational orientation 
and group composition. As can be seen from the figure, individualistically oriented 
negotiators got higher individual outcomes than cooperatively oriented negotiators, both 
when they were in majority, t (8) = 2.19, p < .05, and in minority, t (8) = 1.56, p < .10 (one-
tailed tests).  
Hypothesis 2 suggested that individualistically oriented negotiators would base their 
satisfaction on own outcome, while cooperatively oriented negotiators would use both own 
and joint gain as criteria for satisfaction. We found partly support for hypothesis 2. First, we 
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examined the individualistically oriented negotiators. Individual results and group outcome 
(joint sum) were regressed on satisfaction. As predicted, satisfaction was significantly related 
to individual outcome (β = .55, p < .001), but not to group outcome (β = -.15, ns), R2 = .29, p 
< .001. Second, we did the same analysis with the cooperatively oriented negotiators. This 
regression was not significant, R2 = .03, ns. However, inspecting the correlations within each 
group composition revealed a high and significant relation between group outcome and 
satisfaction in groups where all members were cooperatively oriented (r = .54, p < .001). 
Furthermore, we added a measure of unbalance (standard deviations of group members’ 
individual outcome) in step 2. This increased the explained variance to .24 (∆R2 = .21, p < 
.001), demonstrating that the distribution of individual outcome was important for satisfaction 
of members with a cooperative orientation (β = -.48, p < .001).  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that groups where all the members were cooperatively oriented 
would get higher group outcome than groups with one or more individualistically oriented 
member. The data did not support hypothesis 3. We found no differences in joint sum, F (3, 
33) = .19, ns, and Pareto efficiency, F (3, 33) = .35, ns, across the four group compositions. 
Means and standard deviations for the two indicators of group outcome in each of the four 
compositions are shown in table 2.  
Hypothesis 4 stated that cooperatively oriented groups would perceive higher fairness 
than other group compositions. We found support for hypothesis 4. Group perceived fairness 
differed significantly across group compositions, F (3, 32) = 3.48, p < .05. The mean values 
displayed in table 2 demonstrate that the differences were in the expected direction. Planned 
pair comparisons showed that the cooperatively oriented groups perceived higher fairness 
than each of the other group compositions (t-values > 2, p-values < .05). No other pair 
comparisons were significant. We also ran separate analyses for process fairness and outcome 
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fairness, and analyses with group outcome (joint sum) as covariate. The results remained the 
same. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to build on and extend previous research on 
motivational orientation in negotiation by focusing on three-person group negotiations and 
heterogeneity in orientations. Behavioral negotiation research has traditionally examined 
homogeneous dyads and found dyads with cooperatively oriented members to perform better 
than dyads with individualistically oriented members. In this study we found that motivational 
orientation also has an impact on effectiveness in group negotiations. In mixed groups 
individualistic oriented negotiators achieved higher individual outcome than cooperatively 
orientated negotiators (i.e., hypothesis 1 was supported) and they used different criteria for 
satisfaction (i.e., hypothesis 2 was partly supported). Group composition did, however, not 
affect group outcome (i.e., hypothesis 3 was not supported), but groups with only 
cooperatively oriented members perceived higher fairness than the other group compositions 
(i.e., hypothesis 4 was supported).  
Research Implications 
At the individual level of analysis, we found differential effects of motivational 
orientation on both the individual outcome and on the criteria used for judging effectiveness. 
We found that negotiators with an individualistic orientation achieved significantly higher 
individual outcome than the cooperatively oriented negotiators, both when they were in 
majority and when they were in minority in the groups (marginally significance). From a 
game theoretical perspective, the fact that individualistically oriented negotiators exploit 
cooperatively oriented opponents may seem obviously and trivial. However, in experimental 
games, behavior is largely restricted to either cooperative or conflictive moves, and the 
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outcomes are fully determined by these moves. This is not the case in behavioral negotiation, 
where the relation between orientation, behavior, and outcome may be quite complex. 
Therefore, studies on mixture in orientations has been called for in behavioral negotiation 
research (e.g., Brett, 2001; De Dreu et al., 2000).  
Apparently, in our study the individualistically oriented negotiators have engaged in 
more forceful distributive behavior and exploited their cooperatively oriented partners. The 
cooperatively oriented negotiators have neither matched the distributive behavior sufficiently, 
nor have they been able to put pressure on the individualistically oriented negotiators to 
reduce distributive behavior. The finding that even a cooperatively oriented majority seem 
unable to safeguard against exploitation, contradicts the suggestion that individualistically 
oriented negotiators in minority will be isolated and sanctioned (Brett, 1991). Further research 
should explore whether cooperatively oriented members are able to guard against 
individualistically oriented members when they are in a larger majority. For example, in a 
group of five, four cooperatively oriented members may isolate one individualistically 
oriented member. This point to the importance of examining different sized groups.  
The findings suggest that negotiators base their evaluation of results on their 
motivational orientation. Negotiators seem to both act, get results, and evaluate outcomes 
based on their motivational orientations. Thus, behavioral and attitudinal assimilation 
between individuals in a small negotiating group may be limited. The results call for more in-
depth studies of the interplay between behaviors of negotiators with different motivational 
orientation. 
At the group level of analysis, we found composition to affect fairness perception but 
not joint gain. The non-finding with regard to joint gain is contrary to the findings 
consistently found in research on dyads where cooperatively oriented dyads have been found 
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to do better then individualistically oriented dyads. Tentative findings from previous research 
on groups have suggested that results from dyads get replicated in groups (Beersma & De 
Dreu, 1999; Weingart et al., 1993). However, as stated earlier, Beersma and De Dreu (1999) 
examined team orientation rather than cooperative orientation, and Weingart et al. (1993) 
only found differences when the groups were forced to negotiate each issue sequentially. 
Together, the studies and our results suggest that the findings from dyads cannot be easily 
generalized to the group setting. Furthermore, in their meta-analytic review De Dreu et al. 
(2000) found that effects of orientation on joint outcomes were stronger the fewer issues the 
negotiation task contained, and suggested that the impact of motivational orientation on 
negotiation are reduced by cognitive constraints. Given that group negotiations are more 
cognitively challenging than dyadic negotiations (Bazerman et al., 1988; Kramer, 1991), our 
findings corroborates this suggestion. Motivational orientations may have a lesser impact on 
joint outcome in groups than in dyads. Future research is needed to examine if, and under 
what conditions, motivational orientation influences group outcomes. 
We did however find composition to affect perception of fairness. The members of 
homogeneous cooperatively oriented groups had a higher degree of perceived fairness than 
had members in the groups with one or more individualistically oriented negotiator. Thus, the 
presence of an individualistically oriented negotiator triggers an unbalanced negotiation 
dynamic that reduces perceived fairness. It must be noted that this is a shared perception of all 
group members, also the individualistically oriented negotiators themselves. Moving from the 
laboratory to real life negotiations, we may speculate about the long-term effects of reduced 
fairness. Groups that meet frequently to negotiate (e.g. boards, project teams and management 
groups) may find the lack of fairness to be unsettling, and both climate and the quality of the 
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negotiations may deteriorate over time. Future research on subjective outcome measures such 
as perceived fairness is certainly needed in negotiation research (cf. Oliver et al., 1994). 
Methodological Reflections 
In this study we used a negotiation exercise to simulate and isolate the core dilemma 
of simultaneously creating and claiming value in integrative negotiation situations. In the 
exercise the participants were allowed to interact freely in their efforts to reach an agreement.  
By using an exercise rather than real life negotiations we increased internal validity at the cost 
of external validity.  We believe this trade-off is justified since the scoreable game enabled us 
to compare outcomes across negotiating groups, and since the design gave control for 
variables not focused upon in this study.  
Nevertheless, the discussion about the ability to generalize should not be ignored. The 
main questions are if the results can be generalized from (1) a simulation to real life 
negotiations, and from (2) students to professional negotiators. According to Harris (1990 p. 
295), “... there is little or no evidence that field studies produce different results than 
laboratory studies across several OB and HRM topics”. Recently, Rhoades, Arnold, & Jay 
(2001) replicated laboratory research on affect in negotiation and conflict management with a 
field study. The findings clearly suggest that laboratory findings can be generalized. Of 
course, simulated negotiations do not have all the structural characteristics of real life 
negotiations (Gordon, Smith, & Sneider, 1984). What is important, though, is not that the 
simulation equals real life negotiations along all dimensions, but that it incorporates the 
essential characteristics of real negotiations (Locke, 1986). This simulation was therefore 
carefully developed, and based on the structure that is typically used in research on 
integrative negotiation. However, it is a potential problem that the simulation only had limited 
personal consequences for the participants. Although questionnaire data and our observations 
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of the negotiations indicate strong personal involvement, effects of orientation may be altered 
when more are at stake for the negotiators. It has been argued that the effects found in the 
laboratory only get stronger in more personally involving real life situations (cf. Mook, 1983). 
Still, we can not rule out that there may be interaction effects between motivational 
orientation and personal involvement.  
The second question regarding generalization concerns the use of students rather than 
professional negotiators as participants. Dyads with professional negotiators are found to 
reach higher joint outcome than student dyads in negotiation simulations (Neale & Northcraft, 
1986). However, the students and the professionals were affected by cognitive biases (e.g., 
framing) in the same way. This indicates that it might be differences in the level of outcome, 
but that the pattern of effects is similar as the variables affect students and professionals in the 
same way. Nevertheless, we must as always be careful when generalizing from single studies. 
The major strength of laboratory experiments is clearly the controlled test of effects that are 
assumed to be universal.   
Practical Implications 
Assuming that the effects found in this study are universal, several practical 
implications can be drawn. First, cooperatively oriented members easily get exploited by 
individualistically oriented members. Therefore, when higher-level managers give their 
negotiators instructions to be cooperatively oriented, several safeguards against exploitation 
must be taken. The cooperatively oriented negotiators must prepare for distributive behavior, 
they must in the initial stages search for clues about the opponents’ orientation and not make 
unilateral concessions. The cooperatively oriented negotiators may also prepare to educate 
their counterparts in constructive negotiations. This can be done by clearly labelling 
distributive behavior and by mixed communications (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998). Mixed 
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communications implies that the negotiators explicitly invite others to collaborate, but clearly 
state that they will sanction the other parties if they do not match cooperative signals. Thus, 
when one enters into negotiation with the goal of creating both for self and others, one must 
also be prepared for distribution and for efforts to change the game. Without such 
preparations, cooperatively oriented negotiators may get exploited such as the participants in 
our study. 
Second, at the group level we got effects of motivational orientation on fairness, but 
not on the group outcome. Fairness is of course important in negotiation when for example 
boards decide, companies integrates, alliances are established and developed, and when 
resources are allocated among departments. Thus, from an organizational perspective on 
internal negotiations, and from an interorganizational perspective (e.g., the alliance) on 
external negotiations, instructing negotiators to be cooperatively motivated is feasible. 
However, in group negotiations, as opposed to dyadic negotiations, cooperative motivational 
orientation is not sufficient for achieving high joint gain. Therefore, as we discussed above, 
inducing cooperative orientations must be supplemented with other means such as 
safeguarding tactics and the use of specific procedures in the negotiation process. Thus, group 
negotiations with integrative potential are challenging and difficult for managers. 
Motivational orientation impacts the negotiation, but it is not sufficient to induce cooperative 
motivational orientation to get to high quality and fair “win-win” solutions. 
Conclusion 
This study contributes to research on behavioral negotiation by being one of the first 
studies of how the mix of individualistically and cooperatively oriented group members’ 
affect negotiation outcome. The main lessons learned are that orientation did affect the 
distribution of values in the group (individualistically oriented members got a larger share 
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than cooperatively oriented members), but did not affect the creation of values. However, 
groups with only cooperatively oriented members perceived the negotiation to be fairer than 
did other groups. These findings highlight some of the challenges facing members 
participating in heterogeneous decision-making groups. Clearly, creating knowledge that 
helps negotiators to handle these challenges is a task for future research on small group 
negotiation. 
 
Small Group Negotiation     28 
References 
Bazerman, M. H., Mannix, E. A., & Thompson, L. L. (1988). Groups as mixed-motive 
negotiations. Advances in Group Processes, 5, 195-216. 
Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. K. (1999). Negotiation processes and outcomes in prosocially 
and egoistically motivated groups. International Journal of Conflict Management, 10, 
385-402. 
Ben-Yoav, O., & Pruitt, D. G. (1984a). Accountability to constituents: A two-edged sword. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 34, 283-295. 
Ben-Yoav, O., & Pruitt, D. G. (1984b). Resistance to yielding and the expectation of 
cooperative future interaction in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 20, 323-335. 
Brett, J. M. (1991). Negotiating group decisions. Negotiation Journal, 7, 191-310. 
Brett, J. M. (2001). Negotiating globally. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Brett, J. M., & Rognes, J. K. (1986). Intergroup relations. In P. S. Goodman (Ed.), Designing 
effective work groups. San Francisco: Jossey Bass. 
Brett, J. M., Shapiro, D. L., & Lyttle, A. (1998). Breaking the bonds of reciprocity in  
negotiations. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 410-424. 
Carnevale, P. J., & Pruitt, D. G. (1992). Negotiation and mediation. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 43, 531-582. 
De Dreu, C. K., Giebels, E., & Van de Vliert, E. (1998). Social motives and trust in 
integrative negotiation: The disruptive effects of punitive capability. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 83, 408-422. 
Small Group Negotiation     29 
De Dreu, C. K., Weingart, L. R., & Kwon, S. (2000). Influence of social motives on 
integrative negotiation: A meta-analytical review and test of two theories. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 889-905. 
Deutsch, M. (1994). Constructive conflict resolution: Principles, training, and research. 
Journal of Social Issues, 1, 13-32. 
George, J. M. (1990). Personality, affect, and behavior in groups. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 75, 107-116. 
George, J. M., & Bettenhausen, K. (1990). Understanding prosocial behavior, sales 
performance, and turnover: A group-level analysis in a service context. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 75, 698-709. 
George, J. M., & James. L. R. (1993). Personality, affect, and behavior in groups revisited: 
Comment on aggregation, levels of analysis, and a recent application of within and 
between analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 798-804. 
Gordon, M. E., Schmitt, N. & Sneider, W. G. (1984). Laboratory research on bargaining  
and negotiations: An evaluation. Industrial Relations, 23, 218-233. 
Greenberg, J. (1987). A taxonomy of organizational justice theories. Academy of Management  
Review, 12, 9-22. 
Harris, M. H. (1990). Methodological issues and statistical techniques in conflict management 
research: An update. International Journal of Conflict Management, 1, 293-307. 
Hoyle, R. H., & Crawford, A. M. (1994). Use of individual-level data to investigate group 
phenomena: Issues and strategies. Small Group Research, 25, 464-485. 
Iedema, J., & Poppe, M. (1994). Effects of social value orientation on expecting and learning  
others’ orientations. European Journal of Social Psychology, 24, 565-579. 
Small Group Negotiation     30 
James L. R., Demaree, R. G., & Wolf, G. (1984). Estimating within-group interrater 
reliability with and without response bias. Journal of Applied Psychology, 69, 85-98. 
James L. R., Demaree, R. G., & Wolf, G. (1993). rwg: An assessment of within-group 
interrater agreement. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 306-309. 
Keller, R. T. (2001). Cross-Functional project groups in research and new product 
development: Diversity, communications, job stress, and outcomes. Academy of 
Management Journal, 44, 547-555. 
Kelly, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Errors in perception of intentions in a mixed-motive 
game. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 6, 379-400. 
Kenny, D. A., & La Voie, L. (1985). Separating individual and group effects. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 339-348.  
Kramer, R. M. (1991). The more the merrier? Social psychological aspects of multiparty 
negotiations in organizations. Research on Negotiation in Organizations, 3, 307-332. 
Kuhlman, D. M., Brown, C. E., & Tetac, P. (1992). Judgments of cooperation and defection 
in social dilemmas: The moderating role of judge’s social orientation. In W. B. 
Liebrand, D. M. Messick, & H. A. Wilke (Eds.), Social dilemmas: Theoretical issues 
and research findings (pp. 111-132). Oxford, U.K.: Pergamon Press. 
Lax, D., & Sebenius, J. (1986). The manager as negotiator. New York: The Free Press.  
Liebrand, W. B., Jansen, R. W., Rijken, V. M, & Shure, C. J. (1986). Might over morality: 
Social values and the perception of other players in experimental games. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 203-215. 
Locke, E. A. (1986). Generalizing from laboratory to field settings. Massachusetts, 
Toronto: Lexington Books. 
Small Group Negotiation     31 
Mannix, E. A., Thompson, L. L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1989). Negotiation in small groups. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 74, 508-517. 
McClintock, C. G., & Liebrand, W. B. (1988). Role of interdependence structure, individual 
value orientation, and another’s strategy in social decision making: A transformational 
analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 396-409. 
Messick, D. M., & McClintock, C. (1968). Motivational basis of choice in experimental 
games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4, 1-25. 
Mitchell, T. R., & Larson J. R. (1987). People in organizations. An introduction to  
organizational behavior. McGraw-Hill. Singapore. 
Mook, D. G. (1983). In defense of external invalidity. American Psychologist, 38, 379-387. 
Nagy, M. S. (2002). Using a single-item approach to measure facet job satisfaction. Journal 
of  
Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 75, 77-86. 
Neale, M. A., & Northcraft, G. B. (1986). Experts, amateurs and refrigerators: Comparing 
experts and amateur negotiators in a novel task. Organizational Behavior and Human  
Decision Processes, 38, 305-317. 
Neale, M. A., & Northcraft, G. B. (1991). Behavioral negotiation theory: A framework for  
conceptualizing dyadic bargaining. Research in Organizational Behavior, 13, 147-190. 
O’Connor. K. M., & Carnevale, P. J. (1997). A nasty but effective negotiation strategy:  
Misrepresentation of a common-value issue. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 23, 504-515. 
Olekalns, M., Smith, P. L., & Kibby, R. (1996). Social value orientations and negotiator 
outcomes. European Journal of Social Psychology, 26, 299-313. 
Small Group Negotiation     32 
Oliver, R. L., Balakrishnan, P. V., & Barry, B. (1994). Outcome satisfaction in negotiation: A 
test of expectancy disconfirmation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 60, 252-275. 
Pruitt, D. G. (1990): Problem solving and cognitive bias in negotiation: A commentary. 
Research on Negotiation in Organizations, 2, 117-122. 
Pruitt, D. G., & Carnevale, P. J. (1993). Negotiation in social conflict. Buckingham: Open 
University Press.  
Pruitt, D. G., & Lewis, S. A. (1975): Development of integrative solutions in bilateral 
negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 621-633. 
Pruitt, D. G., & Rubin, J. Z. (1986). Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Rhoades, J. A., Arnold, J., & Jay, C. (2001). The role of affective traits and affective states in 
disputants’ motivation and behavior during episodes of organizational conflict. Journal 
of Organizational Behavior, 22, 329-345. 
Rhoades, J. A., & Carnevale, P. J. (1999). The behavioral context of strategic choice in 
negotiation: A test of the dual concern model. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 
29, 1777-1802. 
Thompson, L. (1990). Negotiation behavior and outcomes: Empirical evidence and theoretical 
issues. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 515-532. 
Thompson, L. L. (1998). The mind and heart of the negotiator. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Tripp, T. M., & Sondak, H. (1992). An evaluation of dependent variables in experimental 
negotiation studies: Impasse rates and Pareto efficiency. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 51, 272-295. 
Wanous, J. P., & Reichers, A. E. (1996). Estimating the reliability of a single-item measure.  
Small Group Negotiation     33 
Psychological Reports, 78, 631-634. 
Wanous, J. P., Reichers, A. E., & Hudy, M. J. (1997). Overall job satisfaction: How good are  
single-item measures? Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 247-252. 
Weingart, L. R., Bennett, R. J., & Brett, J. M. (1993). The impact of consideration of issues 
and motivational orientation on group negotiation process and outcome. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 78, 504-517. 
Small Group Negotiation     34 
Table 1  
Payoff Matrix  
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Issues      Alternatives                   Role 1          Role 2         Role 3          Sum 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Issue 1   A   25  0  50  75 
   B   25  25  25  75 
   C   0  50  25  75 
   D   50  25  0  75 
 
Issue 2   A   150  12.5  25            187.5 
   B   200  0  0  200 
   C   100  25  50  175 
   D   0  50  100  150 
   E   50  37.5  75            162.5 
 
Issue 3   A   50  100  0  150 
   B   0  0  200  200 
   C   37.5  75  50            162.5 
   D   12.5  25  150            187.5 
   E   25  50  100  175 
 
Issue 4   A   0  100  50  150 
   B   50  0  100  150 
   C   50  50  50  150 
   D   100  50  0  150 
 
Issue 5   A   100  0  50  150 
   B   75  50  37.5            162.5 
   C   50  100  25  175 
   D   25  150  12.5            187.5 
   E   0  200  0  200 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Minimum payoff    0  0  0  675 
Maximum payoff    500  500  500  825 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. Negotiators saw only their own payoff, and were not allowed to exchange preference 
charts.
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Group Effectiveness across Group Compositions 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable     CCC    CCI     CII          III 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Joint Sum     M  749   740  749             747 
        SD   28    31   21   32 
Pareto Efficiency      M  .12  -.23  .20  -.12 
        SD  1.74  1.15  1.04  1.20 
Perceived Fairness      M  4.09a  3.57b  3.66b  3.40b 
        SD  0.51  0.44  0.42  0.40 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. CCC = three members with cooperative orientations, CCI = two members with 
cooperative orientations and one member with individualistic orientation, CII = one member 
with cooperative orientation and two members with individualistic orientations, and III = 
three members with individualistic orientations.  
Means in the same row that do not share same subscripts differ at p < .05. 
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Fig. 1.  Individual outcome as a function of own orientation and group composition 
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Note. CCC = three members with cooperative orientations, CCI = two members with 
cooperative orientations and one member with individualistic orientation, CII = one 
member with cooperative orientation and two members with individualistic 
orientations, and III = three members with individualistic orientations. 
